An agenda for change
It is a tragic irony that the bureaucrats, who as generalist are supposed to know everything worth knowing, do not have any idea of their own role in the scheme of things. Ask any civil servant about his own role and changes are that he will either be at loss for words or hesitatingly describe himself as a public servant, an agent of the state. This definition is fine as a public servant, an agent of the state. This definition is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. What for instance is meant by the words ‘state. Does it mean the politically elected government of the day, or does it mean the politically elected government of the day, or does it mean some abstract judicial entity. If the former, the civil servants have no choice but to accept their status as servants of politician; if the latter , they put themselves somehow above the elected government, something which is clearly unacceptable in a democracy. This confusion is not confined to India. Sir Robert Armstrong, and Sir Ian Bancroft, two former heads of the Home Civil Service in Britain seem to hold diametrically opposite view on this issue.
According to Robert Armstrong, “civil servants are servants of the crown. In this context the crown means and is represented by duly elected government of the day………… the civil service as such, has no constitutional personality or responsibility apart from the duly elected government.”
On the other hand his predecessor, Ian Bancroft seems to hold the opposite view. In his opinion, “the civil service belongs neither to officials nor to politicians, but to the crown and the nation.”
That two eminent civil servants hold such diametrically opposite views about their own profession is symptomatic of the confusion that exists on this issue. This confusion is typical of elitist civil services because they so sedulously foster the cult of the generalist. Remember Cardinal Newman’s assertion, quoted earlier that a person with a liberal education is capable of “filling any post with credit and to master any subject with facility.” A man who is supposed to be capable of playing any role that he is called upon to play, is never quite sure what a bottom, is his true vocation-whether he is high minded mandarin, above the dirty business of politics or whether he is nothing more than a tool of the government it is worth expending some thought on the subject.
Broadly speaking the kind of work that civil servant do may be divided into three categories. They act either as managers or policy advisors or are engaged in law enforcement. These three roles are quite different in nature and call for different kinds of skill and attitude.
The role of manager is basically subject to the touchstone of efficiency. Managers require functional autonomy; they require the ability to manage men and money. They can be judged only by the results they produce. Managerial skills are not fostered by hierarchical set ups. They need a different kind of environment to flower. Managers need creative freedom to be able to put their ideas into practice, untrammeled by the restyri8crtiuons of official procedure and routine,. Government needs a lot of managerial talent, but the civil service does not provide the right environment for it. If government is serious about improving the management of the various commercial and autonomous undertakings that it owns, it must enlarge the talent pool from which it return its managers and be willing to play by the discipline of the market place. Individuals coming from civil service background may be good at throwing their weight around but they are incapable of handling the ruthless demands of business. Elitism rests on irrational assumptions of superiority, but the market is no respecter of such pretensions, it is a completely democratic place where all that counts is real ability. Government has to adopt similar eclecticism in its recruitment policies if it improves the quality of its managerial staff.
Management also demands expertise and different jobs requirement different kinds of expertise. Some need ability at financial management; some require focus on marketing ability. All need an in-depth knowledge of the subject and the ability to innovate. Such skills are unlikely to be found in any one organization and government has to cast its net wide if it wants to tap the best talent available. The important thing is that the cult of the generalist with its emphasis on intangible norms and means rather than ends does not produce good managers. What is needed therefore is proper respect for specialized skills.
This is also true of the civil servants who act as policy advisors. What they need above everything else is knowledge. This is more than text book knowledge acquire at academic institutions; although that is the starting point and therefore indispensable. The explosion of information and the fast pace of obsolescence of current knowledge means that it is increasingly harder to keep abreast of all that is happening in a particular field. Only a specialist with comprehensive knowledge of a particular subject cans remain up to date about new developments. Civil servants who advice the government about policy matters are expected to have this kind of knowledge, but the cult of the generalist ensures that no civil servants is ever given the chance to acquire detailed knowledge of any subject. A person whose specialization is in animal husbandry is often sent to manage finance and a botanist may be asked to manage the industries portfolio. The usual practice e in government is to ensure that no one is posted in a department of which he might have detailed knowledge. When civil servants go abroad for training, as most IAs officers do, the authorities make sure that they are not given a chance to put their training to any practical use on their return. If their area of trai8ning coincides with their department, as might happen sometimes they are usually given another posting on their return from training.
The cult of the generalist is defended on the ground that specialization tend to narrow down person’s vision whereas the generalist who knows a little of everything is able to make the broader view. This view is well described by Cardinal Newman in words which have been already been quoted in the last chapter.
But Cardinal Newman’s sweet reasonableness is itself sophistical. His denigration of the specialist rests on false premises about the knowledge. All knowledge is knowledge of something. You cannot exalt knowledge as such while running down the specialist in the same breath. At the back of this is the notion that education should primarily be based on study of classical texts and history etc. it is the old Confucian idea, propounded with greater sophistication but its linkage with elitist notion of education are obvious. What we have here is social and political bias exalted into a philosophical principle.
Still the cult of the generalist suits politicians, because they are, after all, also generalists who do not know even the fundamentals of the subject that they are asked to handle. There are of course well informed ministers but these are the exception rather than the rule. By superimposing a generalist civil servant between themselves and the specialist who are the heads of their subject matter. The civil servant who are thus asked to run the governments by proxy are cleverer then the ministers. Civil service elitism with its claims of omniscience allows them to brush aside the specialist and to substitute their own shallow pretension ion place of real knowledge. The ministers are happy because with this one stroke they accomplish to objectives. The specialist, who with their superior knowledge might pose a putative threat to the ill informed politicians are put in their place, and the ministers are able to the ill informed politicians are put in their place, and the ministers are able to devote their time to the only thing in which they specialize, ie, politics, unburden by the cares of office. This is the only reason why a civil servant who does not know the difference between a howitzer and a bazooka is put over the head of a general who might have risen to the summit of his profession by dint of professional excellence and bravery of his professional excellence and bravery on the battlefields. This is the only reason why a civil servant who does not know wheat from sorghum and rabi from kharif is put over the head of a scientist who may have won international recognition is crop breeding.
All this may be fine the politicians, but it plays havoc with the quality of advice that goes into policy making. What we get is the usual civil service circumlocutions about ‘on the one hand and on the other hand’. This kind of wishy washy advice lets politicians do what they like. In this whole transaction, the real loser is the nation. It is this kind of circumlocution that led to this country’s defeat by china and scandals like Bofors.
There are two way to remedy the situation. As far as managerial posts are concerned by only approach is to follow the principle of finding horses for course’. This means complete eclecticisms in recruitments and an end to the policy of the closed shop. Our aim should be to find the best person for a given job, no matter where he comes from. As far as those posts are concerned whose aim it is offer policy adviser to the government, the best option is to strike a balance between the claims of the generalist civil service and the specialist and permit lateral entry of specialist at a given level, say the joint secretary level. If all posts of joint secretary level are thrown open to all comers who have the requisite qualification and recruitment is strictly on merit, there would be a tremendous improvement in the quality of the civil service. A lot of dead wood would be weeded out and the infusion of fresh talent would provide a fresh perspective. The specialists who have to endure a life time of bondage to stuck up generalists will bear the cross of their inferiority as and a priory established in an open race, fair and square. No longer would the soldier have to click his heels before desk bound civilians ignorant of the art of war, or the scientist defer to the ignorant presumption of the generalist. There would be an all round increase in moral and the quality of advice that goes into policy making would improve tremendously. Most important, the country would no longer have to suffer the consequences of following half backed rhetoric as expert advice.
But when we come to the posts which are concerned with law enforcement we come up against a different kind of problem. The problem arises because of the fact that civil servants who are engaged in offering advice have to have a certain loyalty to the government whereas law enforcement requires complete independence from execution control. The problem is that the same civil servant is expected to do both the jobs. He is expected to be loyal one day and independent the next day. When he is secretary to government he is expected to be simply a loyal agent, who finds his salvation in faithful serving the government of the day. When he becomes, for instance the Chief Election Officer of a state, he is expected to be absolutely even handed in deciding the electro battle which may seal the fate of the same government. Neutrality and independence are of course the core values of the civil service. But that is only on paper. As long as politicians have the decisive say in the career development of bureaucrats they will to call the shorts and civil servants will find it hard to lve to the avowed code of conduct. Their position is rather like the position of humanity in George Herbert’s poem:-
“O wearisome condition of humanity,
Born under one law, to another bound,
Begotten vain, yet forbidden vanity,
Created sick yet commanded to be sound.”
In short it is an impossible mandate.
The problem arose in the first place because of the cult of the generalist which assumes that a person who is good enough to be a member of the elite cadre is good enough to handle
any assignment whatever its requirement. In practice however, as we have seen. Loyalty and independence do not go together. As law enforcement jobs require strict independence, the solution is to separate all such jobs from other executive posts, and to keep them outside the control of the executive. For example the statutory functions performed by the district magistrate demand that this job be kept outside the control of politicians. The code of criminal procedure does not in fact recognize the authority of the state government over the DM, who is the highest executive authority charged with the maintenance of public order. Yet today most DM’s feel obliged to consult the state government before taking any action in a law and order situation. This leads to tragic result sometimes. The classic case is that of the District Magistrate of Faizabad, who failed to prevent the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 on the ground that he was told by the Chief Minister not to take any action in the matter. A similar argument was offered by the Nazis during the Nuremberg trials, but was not accepted by the tribunal. It is yet to be seen what judgment is passed by the Supreme Court in this matter.
Similar independence is needed by the officers in charge of conducting elections. Under the present dispensation the Collector are also appointed as Returning Officers during elections. It stands to the credit of the civil service that most returning officers have so far conducted the elections with a fair degree of impartiality. But already this neutrality is being questioned in an increase number of cases. The situation is much worse with regards to subordinate civil services. Fair and impartial conduct of elections is the cornerstone of democracy and anything less than total neutrality and I impartiality on the part of the election machinery is ultimately fatal to the whole process. That is why it is imperative that we create an independent authority at the state level on the same lines as the central election commission, staffed by civil servants who are not accountable to the government.
I have given but two examples, both of them about jobs done by the Indian administrative service but the same things applies to many other jobs which are concerned with law enforcement. An obvious area is the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. At present this is done by the state police who work under the total supervision and control of the state government. This vitiates the whole process of investigation which must be completely free from interference and external influence of any kind, yet this is what interference and external influence of any kind, yet this is what routinely and external influence of any kind, yet this is what routinely happens, and small time politicians of all parties make it their stock in trade to rescue small time criminals from the police. Even in big cases involving smuggling, drug running, and crime with international ramification, the suspicion of important politicians being involved can’t be ruled out. The supreme court has tried to liberate the CBI from political control but the arrangement devised to ensure its independence are still ad-hoc and of not go far enough.. All agencies, concerned with the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences should be placed under an automatism quasi judicial authority. Ultimately accountable to a bi-partisan committee of the legislature, but enjoying complete functional autonomy. This is the only way to break the politician criminal nexus and save the fabric of civil society.
In sum, the jobs concerned with law enforcement should be hived off from the generalist civil service and assigned to a separate cadre. To those who have a sentimental attachment to elitism and would be loath to see the old civil service divested of its privilege this may indeed prove to be a saving grace, for elitism here would be assets than a liability. After all to enforce the law in letter and spirit, to uphold its majesty and to enlarge its civilizing influence is the prime task of civil society. Those charged with this noble task need courage as well as unimpeachable rectitude, and the consciousness of being engaged in a great mission may well impart a real moral fervor to the whole undertaking and thus redeem elitism from the negative features that we have been at pains to emphasize.
